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The Proposed Panel to Resolve
Intercircuit Conflicts: A Brief View
from the Litigant's Perspective
By EDWARD J. HOROWITZ* AND MARC J. POSTER**

Introduction
The debate over the workload of the Supreme Court has attracted
the participation of Chief Justice Burger, many of the Associate Justices, numerous appellate judges, law professors, members of the executive and legislative branches of government, and many leading
members of the bar.' It appears that the problem has been examined
and the various proposed solutions have been dissected from all perspectives, save one: the view of the average litigant-presumbably the
person meant to benefit most from our judicial system.
The thrust of this Commentary is not to add further thoughts to
those already expressed by the notable participants in the debate. In-

stead, Chief Justice Burger's proposal for a panel to resolve intercircuit
conflicts is discussed from the point of view of typical litigants in our
federal court system. This Commentary concludes that the average
federal court litigant will more likely be harmed than helped by addition of another tier to the federal court system.
I.

The Burger Proposal

The Chief Justice's proposal envisions creation of a new federal
appellate court that would "hear and decide all intercircuit conflicts
and possibly, in addition, a defined category of statutory interpretation
cases." 2 In justifying the need for such a new tribunal, the Chief Justice observes that Congress enacted "more than 100 statutes creating
B.A., 1963, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1966, Harvard Law School.
B.A., 1967, Stanford University; J.D., 1970, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. See generally Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,69 A.B.A. J. 442,
443-44 (1983) (including references to the 1972 Freund Committee Report and the 1974
Hruska Commission Report). See also Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458-59
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Meador, A Comment on the ChiefJustlce's Proposals,69
A.B.A. J. 448 (1983); Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 453 (1983).
2. Burger, supra note 1, at 447.
*
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new claims, entitlements, and causes of action" during his fourteen
year tenure in office. In addition, he notes that judicial opinions "have
also created new causes of action .

.

. ."

The fact that these new

causes of action increasingly have come before the Court is reflected,
the Chief Justice argues, in the great number of petitions for certiorari
filed by persons claiming they were subjected to employment discrimination, from teachers and professors claiming infringement of rights
pertinent to their tenure and employment conditions, from local taxpayers subjected to potentially unconstitutional levies, and from women and minorities seeking recognition of their rights.5 In effect, Chief
Justice Burger attributes much of the Supreme Court's expanding
workload to growing recognition of the legal rights of average litigants.

II. Problems for Litigants
The Chief Justice's plan for easing the workload problems created
by recognizing new claims surely could impede litigants who seek to
exercise their recently acknowledged legal rights. Those litigants
would be frustrated when seeking final judicial resolution of their
claims because they generally can ill afford the additional time, expense, and uncertainty that inevitably would follow from the addition
of another layer to the federal court system. As shown by the following
examples, proposals such as that proferred by Chief Justice Burger
ought to be reconsidered because of the obstacles they present to persons of ordinary means.
Creation of an intercircuit tribunal or a similar court obviously
would increase the length of time necessary to pursue any appeal to
completion. The case must be heard by the court of appeals, then the
controversy would be heard in some fashion by the proposed new appellate tribunal, and finally the case would be presented to the Supreme
Court. The result would be several additional months, if not years,
before the appellate process could be completed.6
Increased delay has far reaching consequences for litigants. For
example, if the litigant involved is a teacher improperly denied tenure
or an employee wrongfully terminated from a job, the time added to
3. Id at 442-43.
4. Id at 443.
5. Id
6. From the authors' experience, the time from notice of appeal to decision in civil
matters before the courts of appeals may range from one to three years. The time a matter
might be pending in the proposed new appellate tribunal would be reduced by the lack of
need to prepare a record on appeal, but could be increased if the tribunal is not able to hear
and decide cases on a regular basis.
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the appellate process almost always will be highly prejudicial regardless of the ultimate outcome. The many harms that flow from prolonged unemployment rarely can be compensated completely. Even
the possibility of retroactive application of a favorable judgment, including back wages, cannot correct all the monetary and psychological
damage occasioned by delays in these kinds of cases. Thus, added delay before the completion of litigation is a significant drawback to
Chief Justice Burger's proposal and others like it.
Another tier to the federal court system necessarily would increase
the costs imposed on appellate litigants. Middle income litigants can
barely afford to pursue their claims in the federal system under present
circumstances.7 The additional attorneys' fees and costs that would be
generated by the creation of a new appellate tribunal may make pursuing a claim to completion in the federal courts economically prohibitive
for many claimants.
Governmental agencies, wealthy employers, and others with substantial means generally have less concern for the costs of defending
most claims; those parties often employ attorneys on a full time basis or
have ready access to legal assistance. If another layer were added to
the federal court system, those defendants would have an additional
advantage when "outwaiting" or "outlasting" less wealthy opponents.
If someone were to conduct a "cost/benefit" analysis focusing on
the types of litigation referred to by Chief Justice Burger in relation to
the creation of a new level of appellate tribunal, one "cost" surely
would be that a substantial number of litigants would forego the remedies supposedly available to them in the federal courts. The apparent
"benefit" is that the Supreme Court's workload ultimately would be
reduced. Whether there is an overall "benefit" to the judicial system
from excluding a significant number of otherwise meritorious claims is
questionable at best and tragic at worst.
A new layer of appellate court also would reduce the predictability
of result in individual cases, and in many instances the result would be
lengthier litigation. Claimants would be unable to assess effectively
their prospects of success before the new court, whatever the makeup of
its judges. Parties would be less able to assume that a controlling rule
that exists in their particular circuit necessarily would be the rule finally applied to the case if there exists a conflict with other circuits,
since such a case would more likely be heard by the new appellate
court.
7. At contemporary hourly attorney fee rates ranging from $70 to $200, additional
costs for litigating in the new tribunal might easily reach several thousand dollars per case.
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Where there exists an intercircuit conflict, litigants with sufficient
means would be encouraged to pursue cases on appeal even though the
rule is against them in their own circuit; their incentive would be the
possibility that they could convince the new appellate court to follow
the rule applied in a different circuit. Conversely, an ordinary litigant
might not pursue a claim to the new appellate court because of the
additional costs involved. From the point of view of the average litigant, the lack of predictability of result in a particular case clearly is a
drawback for the proposed new layer to the appellate courts.8
Conclusion
The primary function of our court system should be to serve litigants and to help them resolve disputes in a peaceful fashion. If, in the
interest of efficiency, access to the judicial system is impeded, the function of courts as the means for conflict resolution also is obstructed,
rather than aided. Thus, any proposal for a new appellate tribunal
must be viewed from the perspective of the average litigant. Our federal court system should not be restructured in a fashion that permits
only the very wealthy to participate because of their ability to pay the
cost or withstand the delay that accompanies litigation.

8. It also should be noted that the delay and complexity added to the federal judicial
system by another layer to the appellate courts likely would reduce the public's understanding of and respect for the system.

